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Abstract—A big data service is any data-originated resource
that is offered over the Internet. The performance of a big data
service depends on the data bought from the data collectors.
However, the problem of optimal pricing and data allocation in
big data services is not well-studied. In this paper, we propose
an auction-based big data market model. We first define the
data cost and utility based on the impact of data size on
the performance of big data analytics, e.g., machine learning
algorithms. The big data services are considered as digital goods
and uniquely characterized with “unlimited supply” compared
to conventional goods which are limited. We therefore propose a
Bayesian profit maximization auction which is truthful, rational,
and computationally efficient. The optimal service price and data
size are obtained by solving the profit maximization auction.
Finally, experimental results on a real-world taxi trip dataset
show that our big data market model and auction mechanism
effectively solve the profit maximization problem of the service
provider.
Index Terms—Big data, data pricing, digital goods, Bayesian
auction, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the recent years, big data from various sources, includ-
ing the Internet of Things (IoT), social network and crowd-
souring, have witnessed explosive increase. It is expected that
the data value will reach $92.2 billion by 2026 [1]. However,
only a small part of today’s data is fully utilized and the usage
is limited as well. For example, in the petroleum industry,
only 1 percent of data from an oil rig with nearly 30,000
sensors is examined [2]. To make profit and increase the data
utilization, data can be sold to other organizations. Fortunately,
the concepts of data as a service (DaaS) and software as a
service (SaaS) have been recently developed. DaaS and SaaS
are the core of big data markets where big data and data
analytic services are traded and offered over the Internet. The
authors in [3] introduced a typical big data market model
composed of three entities, including the data source, service
provider, and service customers. The service provider buys the
raw data from the data source and applies data analytics on
the raw data to create advanced services, e.g., regression and
classification models. This paper addresses the following key
questions:
1) How much data should the service provider buy from
the data sources?
2) What is the optimal price of a service offered to the
customers?
Addressing these questions is important to achieve economic
sustainability and maximum profits in data markets.
To answer the aforementioned questions, we propose an
auction-based big data market model. Since the big data
service is a digital good, we apply the digital goods auction for
optimal pricing and allocating of digital resources. First, the
optimal price and data allocation of the service are obtained
by formulating a profit maximization problem as a Bayesian
optimal mechanism [4]. Our profit maximization model is
truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient.
The optimal data size for maximizing the service’s gross
profit is derived by solving a convex optimization problem.
Second, we analyze the regression problem of taxi trip time
prediction to verify the marginal impact of the data size on the
customer valuation of the service. Our experimental analysis
shows that our auction model is practical and helps the service
provider to make purchase and sale strategies. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper which applies the digital
goods auction in the economics of big data services.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work and provides a brief introduction of
digital goods auction. The system model of big data market is
introduced in Section III. Section IV formulates the profit max-
imization problem and gives theoretical analysis. Section V
presents experimental results of the taxi trip time prediction.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Although the study of the economics of big data is still
immature, a few papers, e.g., [5], [6], [7], addressed the
problem of information valuation and data pricing. The author
in [8] gives a general formula for defining the value of
information which is an important branch in the economic
of information. The profit maximization problem has been
discussed in many fields, such as cloud computing, smart grid,
and cognitive radio networks. A few works have focused on
the big data economics involving data collection, processing,
and trading. A representative monopolistic business model
with two payment methods for IoT information services is
proposed in [9]. Taking the competition factor into consid-
eration, the authors in [7] present a game theoretical model
for substitute and complementary services in the IoT sensing
information market. The authors in [3] develop a subscription-
based big data market model. The pricing of bundled services
is presented in [5].
As an effective pricing and resource allocation method in
economics, the auction theory has been applied in designing
incentive mechanisms to ensure economic sustainability [10],
TABLE I
FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS.
NOTATION DESCRIPTION
c(q) Cost of q data units
r(q) Utility of q data units
k Cost of one data unit
g Service provider’s utility or profit
pi Payment for customer i
xi Allocation setting of customer i
vi Service valuation of customer i
φi(vi) Virtual valuation of customer i
M Number of customers
Υ Influence coefficient
[11]. However, existing pricing approaches based on the con-
ventional auction mechanism are not practical in data services
since they are designed for physical goods with limited supply.
Digital goods have distinct properties including the unlimited
supply and reproduction with almost no marginal cost [12]. For
digital goods, typically the number of items to be sold and the
number of customers cannot be determined in advance. The
authors in [13] apply a digital goods auction in selling copies
of a dataset with the share-averse externality. The authors
in [14] consider the partial competition enabling each bidder
to define the list of its competitors.
Existing works mainly focus on selling the dataset without
considering its internality. In this paper, we explore the utility
of data, e.g., the data size, and its influence on the service
performance and the number of potential buyers. We define
the big data service as a digital good. After the successful
data collection and analytics, the service provider can sell as
many service licenses as there are customers with a neglected
marginal cost.
III. SYSTEM MODEL: BIG DATA AND MARKET MODEL
Figure 1 shows the auction-based big data market model
considered in this paper. The data collector gathers the raw
data generated from various sources like sensors and mobile
devices. The service provider buys the raw data from the data
collector and offers big data analytic services over the Internet.
The service customers are the end users of the data services.
Data is collected at different scales and types. Based on the
human participation during the data collection, data can be
categorized into three classes:
• Crowdsensing data: People collect data using their per-
sonal mobile devices and share the data with the collector.
The data collector may pay for the crowdsensing users.
• Social data: On social networks, people contribute rich
data such as text and images.
• Sensing data: Various sensors, such as GPS, camera and
temperature sensors, generate real-time data in sensing
systems, e.g., smart transportation.
Table I lists frequently used notations used in this paper. We
next introduce the data collection cost of big data services.
Then, we describe the auction between the service provider
and the customers. Then, the utility functions of the service
provider and data collectors are provided.
A. Data Collection Cost
Naturally, the cost of data collection increases substantially
as the data size increases. The data collection cost includes
energy, time, and hardware resources. It is reasonable to
assume that the data cost is monotonically increasing and
convex. The data samples are collected into a dataset which
contains N data units1. Thus, the data size which can be
bought from the data collector ranges from 0 to N data units.
We introduce a continuous variable q ∈ [0, N ] which denotes
the size of raw data sold to the service provider. Thus, we
define the data cost function c(q) as follows:
c(q) = k · q, (1)
where k > 0 is the cost of one data unit. If the optimal gross
profit of the service provider is greater than or equal to 0, the
service provider will buy the data.
B. Big Data Services
As shown in Figure 2, there is a common procedure for
creating big data services. Data cleaning is first applied to
improve the quality of data and remove outlier samples. If the
data are collected from multiple sources, removing redundancy
in data integration is also necessary. The service provider
should transform the data, reduce the dimensions, and extract
best features for the model training.
Classification and regression are two main classes of ma-
chine learning schemes. We consider performance measures
that are associated with the customer experience. For a classifi-
cation problem, the classification accuracy, i.e. the proportion
of correct prediction results, is used as performance metric.
In a regression problem, we incorporate a performance metric
called satisfaction rate based on the median absolute error [15]
as follows:
r(y, yˆ) =
n(|yi − yˆi| < τ)
L
(2)
where yˆi, yi and |yi − yˆi| are the predicted value, true value,
and the absolute prediction error of the i-th data sample,
receptively. τ is a preset upper limit constant that represents
maximum tolerance in prediction quality. The function n(·)
counts the number of data samples satisfying the criteria in the
bracket. L is the total number of data samples in the dataset.
(2) indicates the probability that the prediction error is less
than the tolerance level.
Empirically, we define the service performance metric, e.g.,
classification accuracy and satisfaction rate, by a data utility
function of the data size q:
r(q; a, b) = a+ b · ln(q) (3)
which is monotone increasing and follows the diminishing
marginal utility. a and b are curve fitting parameters of
the data utility function r(q) to the real-world experiments.
1The data unit can be measured in bytes, data sample, or data blocks.
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Fig. 1. Auction-based big data market model
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Fig. 2. Creation of big data services.
According to [16], more data can provide better predic-
tion performance. a and b are obtained by nonlinear least
squares fitting [17]. Specifically, a series of N experimen-
tation points (q(1), α(1)), . . . , (q(j), α(j)), . . . , (q(N), α(N)) is
performed, where α(j) is the performance metric resulting
from a data size of q(j) with q(j+1) > q(j). r(q; a, b) is then
found by minimizing the nonlinear least squares as follows:
min
a,b
1
N
N∑
1
||α(j) − r(q(j); a, b)||2.
In Section V, we will present a case study of regression-
based machine learning algorithms based on real-world
datasets to show the validity of the data utility function (3).
The same analysis can be applied in a classification-based case
study, which is omitted from this paper due to space limit. For
simplified notations, we use r(q) instead of r(q; a, b) in the
rest of the paper.
C. Value Realization
Assume there are M customers, where each customer is
willing to buy the big data service and has an independent
valuation of the service. For customer i , the valuation of the
service is denoted as vi. The service provider first advertises
the available service to the customers. Then, the customers
submit their sealed bids b = (b1, . . . , bM ) which represent
their valuations of the offered services v = (v1, . . . , vM ).
After receiving the bids, the service provider determines the
list of winners containing the allocation x = (x1, . . . , xM )
and prices p = (p1, . . . , pM ). The setting xi = 1 indicates
customer i is within the winner list and being allocated service
while xi = 0 is for no service. pi is the sale price that customer
i is charged by the service provider. At the end of the auction,
the winners make the payment and access the big data service.
With the aforementioned setting, the utility of the service
provider g(x,p) and the i-th customer ui are expressed as
follows:
g(x,p) =
M∑
i=1
xi · pi − c(q), (4)
ui = vi · xi − pi. (5)
As defined in (4), the service provider sets the sale price and
the data size to maximize its profit. The natural objective of the
customer is to choose a bid that maximizes its utility defined
in (5) as the difference between its valuation and price.
IV. BAYESIAN PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AUCTION
The calculation of the winner list is critical for a successful
and efficient big data service trade. In this section, we focus on
maximizing the service provider’s gross profit. We first apply
a Bayesian digital goods auction to calculate the optimal sale
price of the service when the data size is fixed. Then we derive
the optimal solution of the requested data size by solving a
convex optimization problem.
A. Valuation Distribution
Here, we first define customer i’s service valuation vi in the
big data market as follows:
vi = di · r(q) · γ
where di ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of that particular customer
personal preference. High preference degree indicates high
dependence or demand on the data service. di is defined
based on the customer needs, habit, and salary. For example,
a frequent traveler has a high degree of preference for weather
forecast services compared to an office employee. γ ∈ (0,∞)
is the influence coefficient defining the impact of the service
performance on the customer valuation. The final valuation,
i.e., submitted bid, is jointly determined by the degree of
preference and service performance. For simplicity, we assume
that di is a random variable sampled independently from
the uniform distribution with a range of [0, 1]. Then, the
probability density function f(v) and cumulative distribution
function F (v) of the the customer valuation can be derived as
follows:
f(v) =
{
1
r(q)·γ v ∈ [0, r(q) · γ],
0 otherwise.
F (v) = P (V 6 v) =


0 v ∈ (−∞, 0),
v
r(q)·γ v ∈ [0, r(q) · γ],
1 v ∈ (r(q) · γ,∞).
(6)
B. Optimal Sale Price
In our Bayesian formulation, the customer valuation v
are drawn independently from the distribution F (v) given
in (6). We define the virtual valuation of customer i as
φi(vi) = vi −
1−F (vi)
f(vi)
. The virtual surplus of the service
provider can be denoted as
∑M
i=1 xi ·φi(vi)− c(q). From (6),
we can note that the hazard rate of the distribution, i.e.,
f(·)
1−F (·) , is monotone non-deceasing which implies the virtual
valuations are monotone non-decreasing as well. This satisfies
the necessary and sufficient condition for the truthfulness of
the virtual surplus maximization [18].
We next introduce the profit maximization problem based on
the Myerson’s optimal mechanism [19]. This enables deriving
the expected gross profit as a virtual surplus maximization
problem.
Proposition 1. The expected profit of any truthful mech-
anism (p,x) is equal to its expected virtual surplus, i.e.,
Ev[g(x(v),p(v))] = Ev[
∑M
i=1 xi(v) · φi(vi)− c(q)].
Proof: This result follows from the Myerson’s lemma.
Lemma 2. (Myerson’s Lemma) For any truthful mechanism
(p,x), the expected payment of bidder i with valuation dis-
tribution F satisfies:
Ebi [pi(bi)] = Ebi [xi · φi(bi)]
where bi = vi.
The optimal mechanism is described as follows:
1) Receive the sealed bids b and compute the customer’s
virtual bids: b′i = φi(bi) = bi −
1−F (bi)
f(bi)
.
2) Apply the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction [4] on
virtual bids b′ and output the allocation x′ and the virtual
payment p′ which maximize the virtual surplus. In this
step, the virtual payment is computed by
p′i =
{
0 x′i = 0,
min{
∑
j∈W (b
−i),j 6=i
φj −
∑
j∈W (b),j 6=i φj , 0} x
′
i = 1,
where W (b) is the set of winners that are allocated
items and W (b−i) is the set calculated by the VCG
mechanism among all except the customer i.
3) Calculate the final allocation x = x′ and payment p
with pi = φ
−1
i (p
′
i).
Since big data services are digital goods that have unlimited
supply and almost no marginal cost, we can allocate the service
to customer i as long as b′i > 0 in the step 2. Here, the actual
payment that the winning customer must take is the minimum
bid, i.e., inf{b : φ(bi) > 0}, which is the solution for φ(b) =
b − 1−F (b)
f(b) = 0. Hence, according to Theorem 1, the service
provider can offer customers this optimal sale price, denoted
by p∗ = φ−1(0), to maximize his profit in expectation. The
Bayesian digital goods auction has three desirable properties:
• Incentive compatibility: Since the payment required for
customer i solely depends on other customers’ bids in
the VCG auction, the auction mechanism guarantees that
every customer can achieve the best outcome just by
bidding its true valuation, i.e., bi = vi. Being truthful can
curb the market speculation and reduce the unnecessary
cost on making bidding strategy.
• Individual rationality: Each customer will have a non-
negative utility by submitting its true valuation.
• Computational efficiency: The list of winners can be
computed in polynomial time, which has the complexity
only of O(1) per customer.
C. Optimal Data Size
Since the proposed auction mechanism is truthful, the
customer i’s bid is equal to its valuation, i.e., bi = vi. Based
on the optimal mechanism in IV-B, we can obtain the optimal
sale price with predefined valuation distribution F (v):
p∗ = φ−1(0) =
γ · r(q)
2
. (7)
Then, an optimization problem can be formulated in order
to obtain the optimal size of raw data which are bought from
the data collector. Substituting c(q) from (1), r(q) from (3) and
pi = p
∗ from (7) into (4), the expected utility of the service
provider is computed as follows:
Ev[g(q)] =
{
0 q = 0,
M · P (V > p∗) · p∗ − k · q q > 0.
=
{
0 q = 0,
M·γ·(a+b·ln(q))
4 − k · q q > 0.
(8)
Proposition 3. There exists a globally optimal data size q∗
that maximizes the service provider’s expected utility in (8)
over q ∈ [0, N ].
Proof: When the utility of the service provider is positive
g(q) > 0, we can find the second derivative of g(q) as follows:
∂2g (·)
∂q2
= −
M · γ · b
4 · q2
. (9)
Since q > 0 and a, b, γ,M > 0, it can be shown that (9) is
always non-positive. Thus, the utility function g is a concave
function for q ∈ (0, N ]. By differentiating g(q) with respect
to q, we have
∂g (·)
∂q
=
M · γ · b
4 · q
− k.
The optimal solution q∗+ can be efficiently defined by solving
dg
dq
= 0. We can get the closed-form solution of q∗+ as follows:
q∗+ =
{
M·γ·b
4·k 0 <
M·γ·b
4·k < N,
N M·γ·b4·k ≥ N.
(10)
When the utility of the service provider is non-positive g(q) 6
0, the service provider will reject to buy the data. Accordingly,
there exists a globally optimal data size q∗ ∈ [0, N ] which can
be expressed as follows:
q∗ =
{
0, g(q) 6 0,
q∗+, g(q) > 0.
From these results, we can find that the service provider can
reject to buy the data, i.e, q∗ = 0, if the data cost is too high.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: TAXI TRIP TIME
PREDICTION
In this section, we provide a case study along with represen-
tative numerical results of the proposed auction, from which
we can further obtain useful decision making strategies for the
service provider.
A. Experiment Setup
We use a real-world taxi service trajectory dataset [20] to
develop a data service that predicts the trip time for each taxi
driver. The taxi service trajectory dataset includes 442 drivers
and L = 1, 710, 671 taxi trip samples. Each sample contains
taxi geolocation data collected by a vehicular GPS and relevant
information, such as trip ID, taxi ID, and time-stamp. We first
pre-process the raw data by removing the fault data samples
and extract valuable features as well as corresponding labels.
Totally, we prepare 1, 160, 815 samples for model training and
501, 858 samples for testing and performance evaluation. In
our experiment, we use a classical machine learning algorithm,
i.e., random forest regression, for data analytics. We assume a
base of M = 10000 customers. For demonstration purposes,
we normalize the data size q from 0 − N range to 0 − 100
range in this section.
B. Verification for Data Utility Function
We use the performance metric satisfaction rate defined
in (2) to evaluate our data service. For each taxi driver, the
less the difference between the predicted result and true trip
time, the faster the driver will pick up another passenger,
which increases its revenues. We respectively set τ = 60,
180, or 300, where 60 seconds (1 minute), 180 seconds (3
minutes), 300 seconds (5 minutes) are the common tolerance
values for a person to wait for a taxi service. Figure 3
shows the change of the service performance under different
amount of requested data. The service performance increases
as the data size increases, but meanwhile the increase of the
Fig. 3. Estimation of the data utility function r(q) using random forest
regression under different tolerance values. (Top: 60 seconds. Middle: 180
seconds. Bottom: 300 seconds.)
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Profit of service provider g. (a) Impact of p on g. (b) Impact of q on
g.
service performance becomes diminishing. More importantly,
we note that the performance utility function defined in (3)
can well fit the actual performance results which demonstrate
the diminishing returns. From these results, we choose the
tolerance of 180 seconds and use r(q) = 0.4944+0.0079 ln(q)
in the rest of this section.
C. Numerical Results and Strategies for Decision Making
1) Expected Profit of the Service Provider: Figure 4 and
Figure 5 show the impacts of p, q, k and γ on the
service provider’s profit. In Figure 4a, we fix q = 50,
k = 0.5 and γ = 1 while varying the value of sale price
p. Apparently, the optimal sale price that maximizes the
profit is exactly equal to the value calculated by (7). In
Figure 4b, we fix k = 0.5 and γ = 1. When the data
size is small, the service performance is poor and the
optimal sale price is low. Thus, the service provider’s
profit is small. However, if the data size is large, the
service provider has to pay more for the raw data which
causes the decrease of its profit. Clearly, there is an
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Maximum profit of service provider g∗ under varied (a) data unit cost
k and (b) influence coefficient γ.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Optimal requested data size q∗ under varied (a) data unit cost k and
(b) influence coefficient γ.
optimal profit g∗ that can be achieved when the optimal
requested data size is applied. In Figure 5a, we fix γ = 1.
The optimal service provider’s profit g∗ deceases as the
unit cost of data k increases and tends to be zero when k
is too high. In Figure 5b, we fix k = 0.5. We observe that
the optimal service provider’s profit g∗ increases linearly
as the influence coefficient γ increases. The more impact
of service performance on the customer valuation, the
more profit the service provider can achieve.
2) Optimal Data Size q∗: Figure 6 shows the impact of k
and γ on the optimal requested data size. In Figure 6a,
as the unit cost of data increases, the optimal data size
bought from data collector decreases. If the data unit
cost k is quite low, the service provider should always
buy all the collector’s data. However, if data unit cost k
is too high and the service provider will suffer deficit,
the best strategy for service provider is not to buy the
data. In Figure 6b, we observe that the value of q∗
increases linearly with the influence coefficient γ. When
γ becomes large enough, the q∗ reaches and remains
the maximum size 100. This can be interpreted as when
the impact of service performance gets significant, the
service provider should buy as much data as it could.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed an auction-based big data
market model. In the model, we have proposed a Bayesian
digital goods auction to allocate services to customers and
define the optimal sale price for each winner. We have proved
that the mechanism is truthful, individually rational and com-
putationally efficient. Our optimization model maximizes the
service provider’s profit by choosing the optimal sale price and
data size bought from the data collector. Based on a real-world
dataset, we have verified our profit maximization auction and
provided numerical results by a case study on taxi trip time
prediction.
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